I. INTRODUCTION
As a part of the evaluation of Pt, 30 wt% Rh, 8 wt% W alloy (Pt-3008) developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory as a containment material [postimpact containment shell (PICS)] for PuOz radioisotopic heat source fuel for the Improved Mu].-tihundred Watt heat source, a modified Multihundred Watt (MHW) Fuel Sphere Assembly (FSA) was exposed to a single proximity fire of UTP-3001 solid rocket propellant. The FSA is composed of the PICS containing the radioisotopic fuel placed inside a graphite impact shell (GIS) (Fig: 1) . Replacing the standard irridium shell with Pt-3008 is desirable because Pt-3008 is less expensive and easier to fabricate. The test described in this report was carried out to see if a Pt-3008 PICS, which has a melting point some 400°C lower than that of iridium, inside a GIS could survive exposure to the intense heat of the solid-propellant fire. 
TEST DESCRIPTION

A. Test Specimen
A single FSA (PICS T-4 inside GIS S/N 936819-2) was used for the test. It was fabricated by Monsanto Research Corporation's Mound Facility (Miamisburg, Ohio) according to the standard MHW procedures, except that the PuO, fuel was replaced with a Tho, (thoria) simulant and the standard iridium shell was replaced with one made of Pt-3008. The data furnished with the FSA are given in the Appendix. The as-received specimen is shown in Figs. 1 and 2. The FSA was sent to us disassembled to facilitate our pretest inspections. There were no anomalies visible and none were detected by radiography; so the Pt-3008-clad thoria was inserted in the GIS, and the cap was screwed in place to form the FSA.
B. Propellant
The solid rocket propellant used for this test was a piece of UTP-3001 propellant 91.4 by 91.4 by 104.1 cm (36 by 36 by 41 in.). This is the propellant that is used in the Solid Rocket Motors of the Titan IIIE, and it is quite similar to the propellant that will be used for the NASA Space Transportation System (STS) launch vehicle. The propellant was inhibited with Versamid 125*/Epon 815** epoxy on five sides and placed on a sand bed with the uninhibited 91.4-by 91.4-cm face vertical for the test. The propellant was inhibited on all surfaces not facing the FSA test item so that a maximum-duration fire would be obtained to simulate the period during which a large piece of a motor segment would burn.
C. Test Setup
The test setup is shown in Fig. 3 . A tube furnace with a servo-operated door, for preheating the FSA in an air atmosphere, was suspended vertically from the metal stand. Bslow the furnace was an inclined metal trough that, upon initiation of the test, would carry the released FSA to the base of the un- inhibited face of the propellant. The Transite* board seen in Fig. 3 leaning against the propellant face was used only before test initiation to prevent possible contact of the hot FSA with the propellant in the event of a premature FSA release. Immediately before test, this Transite board was removed. A hot-wire-initiated pyrotechnic igniter was affixed to the surface of the propellant. A bank of sand was built up behind the propellant to prevent tip-over of the propellant during the test.
Five W-26 Rem-5 Re thermocouples encased in thoria tubes were placed near the ground level in front' of the burn face of the propellant (Fig. 4) . These thermocouples were connected to strip-chart recorders so that continuous records of temperature during the fire test could be obtained.
D. Test Operation
The furnace containing the FSA was heated to the 1020°C test preheat temperature in 1.5 h. This temperature was maintained by regulation of input power for 30 min to assure uniform temperature of the FSA. The furnace temperature was monitored by two thermocouples.
To initiate the fire test, the furnace door was activated, releasing the FSA. The FSA fell to the inclined metal trough (Fig. 3) and rolled down to the ground in front of the propellant, touching the propellant surface. On contact, the propellant ignited; however, to assure uniform ignition, thle pyrotechnic igniter was initiated. Simultaneously, the metal structure holding the furnace was dragged -5 m away from the ignited propellant by attached cables running to a pole (visible behind the furnace assembly in Fig. 5 ), then to a remotely operated winch. The propellant burned evenly and without incident for 10.5 min. High-speed movies were made of the burn. Figure 5 shows the posttest condition of the test area. The arrow indicates the tested FSA. Figure 6 is a close-up view of the FSA shoying the 1.5-cm-thick deposit of alumina and silica on the side of the FSA that had faced the burning propellant.
Temperatures measured by the thermocouples during the test are given in Table I . The maximum temperature experienced by the thermocouples and, therefore, by the FSA was 2060°C (T/C 1) at the beginning of the test. As the burning surface of the propellant receded from the FSA and the thermocouples, the observed temperature declined.
POSTTEST RESULT
Minor damage including some flaking of the graphite, was sustained by the outer surface of the FSA. Radiographs of several orientations of the FSA indicated that there was no detectable damage to the PICS. The cap of the GIS could not be un- (Fig. 7) and a ring-shaped deposit around a band where the GIS cap threads had been (Fig. 8 ).
There was no observable damage to the vents (Fig.  8) . From the information in Ref. 1, we concluded that the ring-shaped deposit was alumina from the propellant fire and silica from the sand test bed that had penetrated the GIS cap threads.
The PICS was dissected at a 30" angle to the ,weld. There was no observable damage to either the interior surface of the PICS or to the thoria fuelsimulant sphere (Fig. 9) .
Photomicrographs of sections of the two hemispheres and welds are given in Figs. 10-12. The grain structure in all photos appears normal, thus the structure was apparently not altered by the fire test. There was no evidence of chemical reaction or eutectic formation by the carbon, alumina, or silica deposits on the PICS surfaces.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A thoria-fueled, Pt-3008 PICS of an FSA did not fail when it was exposed to a 10.5-min UTP-3001 fire. There was no evidence of any but the most The e i g h t weld shields were processed per l4D-70161 , Opzration KO. 5, (Forniing of Iridium Weld Shfelds). cleaning 2nd one in outgassing. hydrochloric acid soiution and the hardware was hezt treated (oztgassedj for and hour a t 120OoC i n vecuo. t o extreme d i f f i c u l t y i n forming the :.eld shields on t i l e r o i l f i x t u r e . material work hardens rapidly arid exhibits ST?Gi*is spricgbsck acticn.
The f o r t y discs were the:? k i t trezttc' (rec?ystc:liz;d) for m e c o w
A netallographic szmp:r: .ir,dicated tile discs wet-a f u l l y I t should also be noted t h a t 170 cracks o r dc-';c:ina",ions were obzerved However, the cicaning proczdures devizt2d Initial!y, the heinishells were soivent and acid clesned; the l a t t e r being a 50:50 water-hydrochloric acid solution. reweighins, repxkzgiiig, and i d e n t i t y v e r i f i c a t i s n . Ths hemishells wer? -then
hest trezted ( r e c r y s t a l l i z e d ) f o r one h o u r a t 1~3 0 L 1'11 vacuo. lizircj, thzy 1::ere prechsrged and sized on 0.775-!;xh spherical radiused punch through a 1.602-inch diameter hardened steel die.
They were t h e n sent t o t h e Machine Shcp f o r EDM v e n t holes i n the psles ai-.? iappjng i f t h e equator t o give a f l a t surface.
sage l a b inso?ctir;n follcwed; however, t h e rsprocessed hemishells were s t i l l out a f hour,d b u t were pairable and required orientation marks. Re;)orl: No. 10?692 dated October 14, 7977.
After the orientation marks were g r i t blasted cn the paired hemishells, they were sg;in solvent and acid cleaned and heat treated (outgassed) f o r m e hour a t 12OJ"C i n vacuo. They were then sent t o Material Control and t r a n c f i r r e d t o t k e weld group f o r subassembly along with four additional hemishells wb.ich were reFrccsss23 i n July of 1975. cleaned and were s e r i a l i z e d I t shculd be noted a t this point, however, t h a t two hemishells were not acceptable (dye penetrant inspection) i n acccrdazce w i t h 5r%,!<iig No. 1-14944. Further examination indicated t h a t hemishell rewsrk .i;as :!cfeasi b l e , since wall thickness would be s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced because of apparent indication depth. Subscquently, i t was recommesded t h a t this paired s e t of hemishells be r e s t r i c t e d t o weld development.
of four pt-Z;92 hemishells However, this cleaning followed After recrystal-A dye p m e t r a n t and comple.ied I t i s also s i g n i f i c a n t 'io tic;? t k t two o f the 1975 -Peprcc?zsed hemishells (LC?T-22-4 s i 27-2) wer? slss conc'derc-d c o t zcczptalile fsllcwing dye penetrznt inspection. Suhzauant'y, tile zpprarirate dye inspection reparts a r e attached.
) .
--, One complete s e t of hardware was designated f c r T h i s development s e t of hardware was used
The following is a record of assembly of t h a t t e s t capsule:
A l l welds were made using the MH!J fixtures. parameters were adjusted t o accommodate the difference i n the melting temperature of the platinum alloy versus i r i d i u m . made per marked-up Operation Sheet MD-70161, No. 18, (attached).
Hardware: Platinum 3008 -Male -LCPT 26-1
Mate -LCPT 26-4
Gage Report -107692.
The electron beam weld
The GTA weld was Thoria Sphere -S/N 930 (outgassed 2 hours, 1000°F, a t lo-' t o r r ) .
The subassembled hardware was transferred t o the "cold" MI ! W i n e r t gas weld box.
Operation Sheet MD-70161, No. 18. phere w i t h t h e following impurities:
The hardware was assembled using MHW weld fixturing and welded per The PISA was welded in a helium atnios-<30 ppm O l r <500 ppm NZ, and <60 ppni Of H20.
NOTE: Impurity measurements were made before the s t a r t of the weld due t o analyzer interference by the 75 He/ 25 Ar torch gas.
E. W. Johnson February 6, 1978
Weld I n s p e c t i o n s : V i s u a l -good. Two cracks on o u t e r s u r f a c e 0.015'' i n l e n g t h , near dome area.
LCPT-26-2 = Acceptable.
LCPT-26-3 = Acceptable. LCPT-26-4 = Not a c c e p t a b l e i n accordance w i t h DWG. No 1-14944. Two c r a c k s on o u t e r s u r f a c e 0.015" i n l e n g t h , near dome area.
LCPT-26-2' = Acceptable. 
LCPT-
HE1.I I S P HERES
The following p a r t s a r e a c c e p t a b l e on dye p e n e t r a n t i n s p e c t i c n .
LCPT (1) Crack o r t e a r i n c e t r a l 0 . 0 0 2 "~ 0.030", on outer s u r f a c e LCPT-27-2 = ( 1 ) Crack 0.004", ( o u t s i d e o f p a r t ) a t dome. a r e a .
LCPT-27-3 = (1) Rough s u r f a c e l o c a t e d a t i n n e r edge, 0.005" x 0.010".
I n s p e c t e d i n accordance with ASTME-165
?rocedurz A-2
